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LIABILITY OF WATER COMPANIES FOR
LOSSES BY FIRE
New cases continue to be brought.by citizens whose property
has been destroyed by fire because of a failure of the water sup-
ply. In the recent Florida case of Woodbury v. Tampa Water-
works Co., 49 So. 556; 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1034, it was held that
where a water company, engaged in the public service of supply-
ing water for public and private use, had contracted with a city
to furnish water for the putting out of fires, it was liable to a
citizen for a loss caused by the company's failure to live up to
its contract. This decision has been rather severely criticised,'
and it is contrary to the great weight of authority, numerically
counted. The liability of the company has two possible bases, its
contract with the city and its public duty as a public service cor-
poration. These will be considered separately.
LIABILITY ex contractu.
Of course there is no privity of contract between the citizen and
the water company. 2 Privity of contract may be defined as the
relation existing between a promisor and a promisee. The citizen
is not a promisee. After a period of doubt about the matter, it
came to be believed in England that only a promisee can enforce
a promise by action at law In Massachusetts the contrary was
held originally, but in recent years the Massachusetts court has
adopted the English view. A few other States have followed the
example; and even in the States not doing so, the English doc-
trine has clouded the ideas of the judges and has caused them to
limit the rights of beneficiaries in various logical or illogical ways.
It is beyond question that the courts have power to recognize
and enforce duties in favor of persons who are not promisees.
In early times, a parol promise conferred no rights enforcible at
law, even in favor of the promisee. But the common law was
changed by judicial action, and such promises are now so closely
I Case and Comment, November, igog.
2 The city is not acting as an agent in making the contract for the
individual citizens as principals. Ancrum v. Camden W. Co. (So. Car.)
2r L. R. A. (N. S.) lo29; Allen v. Shreveport W. Co., 113 La., iogi.
a Tweddle v. Atkinson, I B. & S. 393.
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interwoven into our commercial life that the profession is un-
aware that they ever were unenforcible. Again, under the guise
of an "implied" contract, the courts have enforced numberless
duties where there was no privity of contract; the "implied" con-
tract was a mere fiction, and has now been rechristened a quasi-
contract. The Lord Chancellor, sitting in the seat of his ecclesias-
tical forebears and following their example, found no difficulty in
permitting a beneficiary to enforce a trust, though there was no
privity between him and the trustee. The duty of the trustee arises
out of his taking possession of specific property; but if the courts
could construct and enforce a duty thus arising, at the suit of the
beneficiary, there is no reason why they cannot construct and en-
force, at the beneficiary's instance, a duty arising out of a binding
executory promise to a third person. In the case of the trust,
it was the moral duty that the courts recognized, and the fact
that specific property was involved is an immaterial thing unless
the courts arbitrarily make it material. If the courts could rec-
ognize the moral duty in cases where there was a specific res, but
no privity whatever, by the same token they can recognize and
enforce a moral duty arising out of an executory promise. If they
could once create in favor of a stranger a right in rein, they can
to-day if they choose create in favor of a stranger a right in per-
sonam. If a court of equity could do this once, it can do so to-
day. If a court of law could once attach an obligation to parol
promises in favor of a promisee, it can do so to-day in favor of
a beneficiary. The sufficient proof of this is the fact that the
courts have done so in nearly every State within the last fifty
years. If a court of law can turn moral duties into legal duties
by calling them quasi-contracts, it can add another quasi-contract
to their number by enforcing a promisor's duty to a beneficiary.
It must be remembered that there is such a thing as equity
jurisdiction to-day, and that in no respect has the chancellor's
power been allowed to die that legal death of disuse and oblivion.
And as, under the codes, most of our courts have equitable as
well as legal jurisdiction, our judges should have a lively realiza-
tion that they are chancellors as well as judges. The English
judges have been so far from having this realization, and the
barristers found it so hard to amalgamate legal and equitable
principles, that it has been necessary to perpetuate the old dual
system by having separate Chancery and King's Bench divisions
of the High Court. This is not desirable or necessary in the
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American courts, but our courts should not deny a beneficiary a
remedy, merely because former courts of common law did so.
That it is generally felt by the courts that the beneficiary of
a contract between two others should have a remedy, is amply
attested by the decisions. From Professor Williston's analysis
and classification of the decisions, 4 it appears that everywhere,
England and Massachusetts included, the beneficiary of an in-
surance policy may sue on the policy. Of course there is no
privity, but the beneficiary ought to have a remedy, and is given
one in spite of that fact. A logical distinction is drawn between
a sole or donee beneficiary and a creditor or obligee beneficiary,
depending upon whether the promisee owed the beneficiary any
legal or equitable duty. The above mentioned classification shows
that there are sixty-six decisions in twenty-five jurisdictions al-
lowing a sole beneficiary to sue, not counting insurance policy
cases. A creditor beneficiary has been allowed to maintain an
action in 232 cases in thirty-five jurisdictions, not counting suits
by mortgagees. A mortgagee may sue the grantee of the mort-
gagor on a promise made to the mortgagor to pay the debt. This
appears to be the law in 126 decisions in twenty-nine jurisdictions.
For individual variations and for a discussion of underlying
theories, Professor Williston's chapter should be read. Enough
has been said here to show that we need no longer to be worried
by the absence of "privity."
Notwithstanding such general recognition of the right of a
beneficiary, it is generally held that a water company is not liable
to a citizen whose property has been burned. This is, of course,
strictly consistent in those jurisdictions where the rights of no
beneficiary are recognized and enforced.' In Connecticut, how-
ever, a mortgagee is allowed to sue, as explained above, and so
is the beneficiary of an insurance policy. The decisions in these
jurisdictions should be no authority in States that have aban-
doned the requirement of privity. The Connecticut water com-
pany case, indeed, was decided on the insufficiency of the plead-
ings, and should not be regarded as settling the Connecticut law
on the subject.6 However, decisions in other States have been
largely based upon the two cases cited above.
4 IVald's Pollock on Cont., Williston's Ed., pp. 237-278.
rf'Atkinson v. Waterworks Co., L. R., 2 Ex. D. 441; Nickerson v.
Bridgeport Hydraulic Co., 46 Conn., 24: perhaps also Louisiana; Allen v.
Shreveport W. Co., 113 La., O91.
6 The same may be said of Hone v. Presque-Isle TV. Co., 1O4 Me., 217.
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In three States the rule has been definitely adopted that
the citizen has a remedy against the water company.7 In twenty-
three jurisdictions, besides Connecticut and England, the oppo-
site has been held. 3 Of these the decisions in Alabama, California,
Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Illinois, Wisconsin, and Federal Reporters
merely follow more or less blindly, the numerical majority. They
add little weight, other than numerical, to that majority. In
three decisions, those in Kansas, 113 Louisiana, and 79 Iowa, it
is said that the city had no power to make a contract for the
benefit of its citizens.0 This looks unreasonable, but if correct,
it is a good defense against the citizen, for a beneficiary always
must take subject to such infirmities as originally existed in the
contract when made.
Texas alone suggests that the company's default is not a
proximate cause of the citizen's loss-or, rather, the court says:
"So, injury resulting from a failure on the part of the water
company, would not be proximate, but remote, as a cause." This
is evidently considerably mixed. The pregnant admission that
7 Woodbury v. Tampa WVaterworks, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.), 1034.; Pa-
ducah Lumber Co. v. Paducah IV. Sup. Co., 89 Ky.,. 340; Gorrell v. Greens-
boro TV. Sup. Co., 124 N. C., 328; and see Planters' Oil Mill v. Monroe
W. & L. Co., 52 La. Ann., 1243, later overruled.
sLovcjoy v. Bessemer TV. Co., 146 Ala., 374; Town v. Ukiah W. &
Imp. Co., 142 Cal., 173; Fowler v. Waterworas Co., 83 Ga., 219; Bush v.
Water Co., 4 Ida., 618; Peck v. Sterling TV. Co., 1I8 Ill. App., 533; Fitch v.
Seymour TV. Co., 139 Ind., 214; Davis v. Clinton W. Co., 54 Iowa, 59;
Becker v. Keokuk Waterworks, 79 Iowa, 419; Mott V. Water Co., 48 Kan.,
12; Allen v. Shreveport W. Co., 113 La., io9r; Hone v. Presque-Isle TV.
Co., 1o4 Me., 217; Wilkinson v. Water Co., 78 Miss., 389; Howsman v.
Trenton TV. Co., 119 Mo., 304; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Trenton W'. Co., 46
Mo. App., 118; Eaton v. Fairbury W1aterworks, 37 Neb. 546; Ferris v. Car-
son TV. Co., 16 Nev., 44; Wahuwright v. Queens Co. W'. Co., 78 Hun., 146;
Blunk v. Dennison IV. Co., 71 Ohio St., 250; Beck v. Kittanning W. Co.
(Pa.), ii AtI., 300; Ancruin v. Camden IV. Co., (So. Car.), 21 L. R. A.
(N. S.), 1o29, 64, S. E., 15i; Foster v. Lookout W'. Co., 3 Lea (Tenn.),
42; House v. Houston U'. Co., 88 Tex.. 233; Britton v. Green Bay U'. Co.,
8I Wis., 48; Boston Safe D. & T. Co. v. Salem W'. Co., 94 Fed., 238;
Met. Trust Co. v. Topeka W'. Co., 132 Fed., 702.
9 Contra: Ankrum v. Camden TV. Co. (So. Car.), 64 S. E., 151, 21
L. R. A. (N. S.). io29. The dictum in Allen v. Shreveport TV. Co.. 113
La., iogi, 1o98, that the city cannot be given power to make a contract for
the benefit of its citizens unless it also has the power to bind them indi-
vidually to perform promises on their part, is absolutely incorrect on
principle.
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the injury results from the failure of the company readily
prepares us to believe that such injury is not the proximate cause
of the company's failure.
Four decisions 10 hold that the payment of a special water tax
by the citizen creates no privity between him and the com-
pany. This is probably correct, but likewise immaterial in States
that have abandoned the requirement of privity, as all four of
these States have largely done. But one who pays a special water
tax can scarcely be said to be a "stranger to the consideration."
Pennsylvania says that the plaintiff's interest is too remote to
raise a privity. But the courts of that State do not know whether
privity is necessary or not, as appears from Professor Willis-
ton's citations. They certainly allow a mortgagee to sue on a
promise not made to him and for which he paid nothing.
The decisions in Kansas, Idaho, 113 Louisiana, Mississippi.
Nebraska, South Carolina, and Texas say that the contract was
not made for the plaintiff's benefit, though in the Kansas case
the contract expressly states that it was made for the benefit of
the citizens. This is a good defense, perhaps, if it is true in fact.
The terms of the contract made with the city are different in the
different cases. In some of them a reasonable argument cer-
tainly was made, to show that the citizens were not beneficiaries. "
But an express provision should put it beyond doubt. It may be
that no moral duty arises from a contract in favor of a patty
whose interests the contracting parties did not have in mind. Yet
all of these States allow a creditor beneficiary, such as a mort-
gagee, to sue, though the contracting parties rarely have the
creditor's interests in mind. Professor Williston apparently
adopts the view of these courts, for he says: "Though the town
or district which is the promisee, not being itself liable for the
lack of water or for the destruction of the building, has no pe-
cuniary interest in the performance of the promise, yet it may be
doubted whether the stipulation was exacted for the benefit
of such people as might have their buildings destroyed fom lack
of water. It is a more reasonable construction that the object
of the proimise is to benefit the community as a whole. Whatever
may be the reason, the plaintiff is not usually allowed to recover
1048 Kan., 12; 79 Iowa, 419; 37 Neb., 546; lO4 Me., 217.
"1 See Ancrum v. Camden TV. Co. (So. Car.), 21 L. R. A. (N. S.),
1029, and Allen v. Shreveport PV. Co., 113 La. looi.
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in such cases." 12 It is difficult to see how the community as a
whole can be benefited except through the individuals that com-
pose that community. And it is a very hollow benefit that is
conferred by a contract for breach of which no one can collect
damages-not the city, for, as Professor Williston says, it has
no pecuniary interest 12a--not the community at large, for they are
too indefinite, and only one of them has been injured-and not the
individual injured, for it is said the contract was not for his
benefit. The reasoning of the Louisiana court is strongly per-
suasive against this view:
"But it is not so clear that the waterworks company, having
contracted with the city to supply water adequate to -the fire
necessities of the town, and failing to do so, is not liable to citizens
for losses directly traceable to its failure. Many authorities in
other jurisdictions are cited by counsel for defendafht to show
non-liability, but it is not certain they are applicable here, consid-
ering the provisions of our codes and statutory law. This con-
tract, as made by the city of Monroe, was intended by both parties
to inure to the benefit of the inhabitants of the town. The stipu-
lations therein made as to a water supply for use in case of fires
was in their favor. Art. 189o of the Civil Code declares that
'A person may also, in his own name, make some advantage for
a third person the condition or consideration of a commutative
contract or onerous donation; and if such third person consents
to avail himself of the advantage stipulated in his favor, the
contract cannot be revoked.' The property taxpayers of Monroe,
by voting a special tax in aid of the waterworks contracted for by
the city, and subsequently paying it, signified their assent to ac-
cept the provisions of the contract which were designed to inure
to their benefit. . . If there be in this contract no express
stipulation in favor of the citizens and taxpayers that a sufficient
supply of water to extinguish fires would be furnished, does not
such stipulation resulf by necessary implication? It would seem
that the waterworks company, by reason of having accepted the
obligations imposed by the city ordinances and by the contract it
12Pollock on Contracts, Williston's Ed., p. 254.
l a 7'on vz. Ukiah IV. & Imp. Co., 142 Cal. 173. carries this to the ex-
treme of holding that even the town has no right of action for damages
caused by the burning of municipal property. That is, the town as a cor-
poration, as well as the town as composed of individuals, must be con-
tent with those ethereal benefits to be derived by everybody but by nobody.
HeinOnline -- 19 Yale L.J. 430 1909-1910
430
i s s s. 12 t i i i lt t
hole can e e efite t t r t i i i l t
se t t it . it i t
conferred by a c tract f r r f i ll t
a a es- t t it , f r, r f r illi t s ,
ec iar i terest 2"- t t it t l ,
too indefinite, and only e f t e as i j r - t t
individual injured, for it is sai t e c tract s t f r i
fit. i
s si i t t i i :
" ut it is t s clear t t t t r r s , i
contracted ith the cit t s l t r t t the i
necessities f t e t , f ili t , i t li l
f r l i tl t l t
other jur-isdictions are cite s l f r f ndant t
non-liability, but it is t certai t r li l r , i
eri t e r isi s f r t t t l .
tr t, s t it ,
to inure to the benefit f the i a ita ts f t t . ti -
lations therein ade as to a ater s l f r se i s f fir s
as in their favor. rt. 1890 of t e i il e (Ie l r s t t
' person ay also, in his , t r
a third person the condition or consideration f a c tati e
contract or onerous donation; and if such third person c se ts
to avail hj self of the advantage sti late i is f r, t
contract cannot be revoked.' e r ert t rs f r ,
ti s i l t i i t t
the city, and subsequently i it, i ifi t ir t t
cept the provisions f t e c tract i r i t i
t t eir e efit. t r i t i t t
sti l ti i f r f t iti i t
supply of ater t e ti is fir s l f r i ,
s c sti lati r s lt r i li ti
that t e ater r s , r i
obligations i posed by t e cit r i a ces t tr t it
12 Pollock all Contracts, Williston's Ed., p. 254.
I~a T(1~,ll ~'. C'ltillh TV. & Imp. Co., 142 Cal. 173. carries this to the ex-
tre e of holding that even t e t s ri t f ti
caused by the burning of unicipal property. hat is, the t s a c r-
poration, as well as the to n as co posed of individuals, ust e c -
tent with those ethereal benefits to be derived by everybody but by nobody.
LIABILITY OF WATER COMPANIES
had entered into, had a public duty to perform which embraced
in its benefits every property owner in Monroe. And it would fur-
ther seem that the contract it entered into was not made more for
the benefit of the municipality itself than for the benefit of the
inhabitants of the town. . . . Municipal governnients, while
legal entities, are no more than convenient regulations instituted
by the people that they may act in their aggregate character to
secure their larger protection and happiness. Municipalities are
the people acting in their corporate capacity. It was the people's
money that was paid to the water company. It was for the
benefit of the people that the promise was made on the part of
the company to supply water for extinguishing fires. If it were
to the public that the promise of the contract was made, then it
was to 'the public as composed of individual persons.' The munici-
pality was btit the agent of the public as thus composed. Its acts
in the matter of the contract under consideration were chiefly
fiduciary. The beneficiaries are the corporators. It will not do
to say that the water company owes them no duty." '1
The code provisions cited by the court in the above opinion do
not distinguish the case from cases in other States, for the court
used those provisions merely to do away with the necessity of
a direct relationship or privity; they do not affect in the least
the question of fact as to whether the contract was made for
the benefit of the citizens. Georgia has a similar code provision,
and twenty-one of the other States denying the plaintiff a remedy
have in very numerous judicial decisions declared that privity is
not always required. Hence, the Louisiana code merely puts
Louisiana on the same footing as these other States. 4
It is probably true that the general code provision permitting
the real party in interest to sue in his own name, was not in-
tended to apply to contracts for the benefit of a third person.
That code provision was intended to affect procedure only, in
cases where there was an already recognized right, as where the
assignee of a chose in action had to sue in the assignor's name
13 Planters' Oil Mill v. Monroe W. & L. Co., 52 La. Ann., 1243. This
case was expressly overruled later in Allen z. Sirreveport W. Co. 13
La., logi, and this reasoning was disapproved, greater weight being put
upon the legal personality of a municipal corporation. The court also
seemed to adopt the requirement that privity is necessary. The question
of liability cx delicto was expressly excluded from consideration,
14 But see the preceding note.
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or where the owner of an equitable interest could bring no
suit whatever at law. It was not intended to create or to con-
firm the substantive right itself. The question of the beneficiary's
right to sue is as to whether a contract can confer a substantive
right upon a third person. If it does, then no doubt the code from
vision will authorize him to sue in his own name.
The greater number of decisions denying a remedy against
the water company are based upon the doctrine that a beneficiary
cannot sue unless he is a person to whom the promisee owes
some legal or equitable duty,-that is, a creditor beneficiary may
sue, but a donee or sole beneficiary may not. This rule probably
originated in the accident that in the case of Lawrence v. Fox"
the promisee Holly was indebted to the plaintiff Lawrence. Later
cases assumed that such a relation of indebtedness was essential
to the plaintiff's right, and it was definitely laid down as the law
in Vrooman v. Turner.16 But in fact, there is much less reason or
necessity for allowing a creditor beneficiary to sue than for allow-
ing a sole beneficiary to sue. The creditor already has an ade-
quate remedy against his obligor, the promisee. And the promisee
has a financial interest in the performance of the promise, and
so may get full damages from the promisor in case he breaks
his contract. In the case of a sole beneficiary neither of these
things is true. Furthermore, if the creditor beneficiary may sue,
it is somewhat probable that the promisor will be subjected to two
suits on the same promise. This is not nearly so likely if the
beneficiary is the sole beneficiary, for then the promisee, not being
financially interested, is not at all likely to sue and can get only
nominal damages if he does sue. For this reason alone the
United States Supreme Court held that a creditor beneficiary can-
not sue, at the same time laying down the dictum that a sole
beneficiary may.' 7  In a late decisiofn' 8 the New York Court of
Appeals has not followed the rule laid down in Vrooman v. Tur-
ner, though not expressly overruling it. In this case, the plaintiff
was in fact a sole or donee beneficiary. Of course it is impossible
to say whether the New York court will adhere to its latest opin-
ion.
152o N. Y., 268.
16 69 N. Y. 280.
17 National Bank v. Grand Lodge, 98 U. S. 123.
18 Buchanan v. Tilden, 158 N. Y., iog.
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Of the cases holding that a citizen has no remedy against a
water company, cited above in note 8, those of the following
States rest their decision upon the rule in Vrooman v. Turner,
in most of them that case being expressly cited: Georgia, Iowa,
Illinois, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New York (Hun), Ohio,
Tennessee, Texas, and 94 Federal. They do not deny that the
citizen was'a beneficiary intended, nor do they deny that the loss
is due to the water company's breach of contract or duty; but
they say that the citizen cannot sue because he is not an obligee
or'creditor-he could not have sued the city. It is true the city
owes him no duty to supply water, for breach of which it can
be sued by him.' 9 But if that fact is immaterial, if the rule in
Vroontan v. Turner is bad law and has in effect been abandoned
by the very court originating it, then the above cases based on
it must fall for lack of a foundation, however numerous they may
be, and should not be followed elsewhere. The individual prop-
erty owners are in fact the sole beneficiaries of the promise of the
water company to supply sufficient water to put out fires in private
property. If they have no remedy against the water company,
they have no remedy against anybody; they have paid their
water tax merely in return for the pleasure of supposing that
they would get water when the peril comes; and the water com-
pany may break its contract without being liable to pay substan-
tial damages to anybody. 0 There is no doubt that a sole bene-
ficiary should be given a right of action, as he has actually been
given in at least sixty-six decisions in twenty-five jurisdictions,
21
including the States of Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Mis-
souri, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, South Carolina and Wiscon-
sin, who inconsistently deny a remedy against a water company,
and four of whom inconsistently cite Vroonan v. Turner.
LIABILITY ex delicto.
In the recent Florida case, the liability of the water company
is based upon principles of tort as well as upon contract. This
19 Fire Ins. Co. v. Village of Keeseville, 148 N. Y., 46; Planters' Oil
Mill v. Monroe, 52 La. Ann., 1243.
20 "We recognize that the absence of a remedy by suit for damages for
failure by a water company to furnish water for fire purposes, according
to its contract with the city, leaves the subject in an extremely unsatis-
factory condition." Lovejoy v. Bessemer W. Co., 146 Ala., 374.
21 Pollock on Cont., Williston's Ed., p. 249. This is not including
insuraice policy cases.
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part of the decision has been more severely criticised than the
former part.2 It is said that the legal duty of the company is
founded solely upon "implication of law," and that this is much
the same as the rule of determining cases by the "length of the
chancellor's foot." It is alleged that "the court is enacting a law
which is entirely beyond its power to enact," and that it is the
province of the legislature and not of the courts to make law. The
plaintiff is declared to be a mere "volunteer," the doctrine is
"startling," its result will be an "overwhelming amount of disaster
and litigation," and it subjects the obligations of public service
corporations to "indefinite expansion at the whim of the courts."
It has long been the idea of the uninformed that the courts
merely find the law already made and apply it, but that they do not
create it. To the historical student of our common law, that prop-
osition is the merest fiction. Judges are indeed great if they pos-
sess great ability to apply already established general principles
to new specific cases, by process of deductive reasoning. But
the greatest judges of all are those seers like Lord Mansfield
and James Kent, who can go into the great human field of indi-
vidual cases and by inductive investigation and comparison dis-
cover a new general principle. Sometimes a new and beneficial
principle merely grows, like Topsy, in spite of the judges, and
it may be because of their very ignorance. The rule that the
beneficiary of a contract may sue is perhaps an example of such
a growth. But the whole common law is the creation of the bench
and the bar, and now is not the time for an unenlightened denial
of that fact. Principles of the "law merchant" may indeed have
originated with the merchants of the seas, though even they
were more probably discovered by the "prudhommes," some wise
old Bellario or instructed young Portia, to whom disputes were
submitted for settlement and whose wise words were "recorded
for a precedent" and became the law. It is chiefly the action of
be bench that has fastened these principles upon the English
gpeaking nations, and the judges could pick and choose among
them at will. Lord Holt was well within his prerogative when
he decided that bills of exchange were negotiable at common law,
but that promissory notes were not. However wrong he may have
been from the standpoint of sound public policy, his decision was
the law until reversed. It is so with us to-day, even in the domain
22 Case and Comment, November, igog.
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LIABILITY OF WATER COMPANIES
of constitutional law. By the fiat of the Supreme Court, United
States Notes are legal tender to-day, though they were not yes-
terday; and Congress could pass a valid income tax law yester-
day, without regard to population, though it cannot do so to-day.
A search for the origin of that "legal duty," the breach of which
is a tort, will result in the discovery that it is a legal duty merely
because some judge or judges believed it to be a generally recog-
nized moral duty and gave a remedy for its breach. The legis-
lature has had little to do with the law of torts.
Every branch of law proves in innumerable instances that the
judges have created and changed the law. Once a parol contract
was unenforcible. Later the judges said breach of a promise was
a deceit, and allowed an action on the case. The result was a
legal revolution. A new right and a new obligation had come
into existence, with a flood of new doctrines, extensions, and
limitations, with myriads of glosses on them. The doctrine of
consideration was slowly and painfully evolved. None can gain-
say that it is the creation of the courts, though its exact parentage
and the date of its birth are uncertain, and though the courts do
not even yet agree as to all the attributes of their offspring. By
legal fictions and self-deception, the courts have turned such a
multitude of supposedly moral obligations into legal obligations,
that they must now be placed in a new category--quasi-contracts.
A striking illustration of a legal duty founded on moral duty
is found in Queen v. Instan.2 3 A helpless old lady was allowed
to go without food or nursing, and death was accelerated. A
niece who lived with the old lady was held guilty of manslaugh-
ter, by mere neglect. Am I my brother's keeper? At least I
may be my aunt's. Cases of first impression are often said to be
determined by the jus naturae-akin to the jus naturale of the Ro-
man law.24 Witness also the doctrine of aequum et bonum.
"In the .absence of statute or some principle adopted from the
civil or canon law, moral obligations carry with them legal or
equitable rights, only when judges, balancing considerations of
justice and right with considerations of public convenience, prac-
tical expediency, and common sense, come to the conclusion that
it is well to give them legal efficacy." 25
23 (1893). I Q. B., 450, opinion by Coleridge, L. C. J.
24 See Bradford Corp. v. Ferrand (i9O2). 2 Ch. 655 (underground
watercourse, no riparian rights); Bird v. Holbrook (1828), 4 Bing., 628
(spring-guns, liability to trespasser based on humanity).
2 A. H. F. Lefroy in 22 Law Quar. Rev., 302.
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"Private justice, moral fitness, and public convenience, when
applied to a new subject, make common law without a prece-
dent." 26
"Where there is no governing precedent, direct or indirect,
justice and other principles of right and wrong, the fitness of
things, convenience, and policy, make case-law." 27
"Whence then do the courts derive those new principles, or
rationes decidendi, by which they supplement the existing law?
They are in truth nothing else than the pripciples of natural
justice, practical expediency, and common sense. Judges are
appointed to administer justice-justice according to law, so far
as the law extends, but so far as there is no law, then justice
according to nature. Where the civil law is deficient, the law
of nature takes its place, and in so doing puts on its character
also. But the rules of natural justice are not always such that he
who runs may read them, and the light of nature is often but
an uncertain guide. Instead of trusting to their own unguided
instincts in formulating the rules of right and reason, the courts
are therefore wisely in the habit of seeking guidance and assist-
ance elsewhere. In establishing new principles, they willingly
submit themselves to those various persuasive influences which,
though destitute of legal authority, have a good claim to respect
and consideration. They accept a principle, for example, because
they find it already embodied in some system of foreign law. For
since it is so sanctioned and authenticated, it is presumably a just
and reasonable one. In like manner the courts give credence to
persuasive precedents and to judicial dicta, to the opinions of text
writers, and to any other forms of ethical or judicial doctrine
which seem good to them. There is, however, one source of judi-
cial principle which is of special importance, and calls for special
notice. This is the analogy of pre-existing law. New rules are
very often merely analogical extensions of the old. . . It is
surprising how seldom we find in judicial utterances any explicit
recognition of the fact that in deciding questions on principle, the
courts are in reality searching out the rules and requirements of
natural justice and public policy. The measure of the prevalence
of such ethical over purely technical considerations is the measure
in which case law develops into a rational and tolerable system as
26 Willes, J., in Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 4 Burr. 2303.
2
7 Lord Mansfield in S. C.
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opposed to the unreasoned product of authority and routine. Yet
the official utterances of the law contain no adequate acknowl-
edgment of this dependence on ethical influences. 'The very
considerations,' it has been well said (Holmes, Common Law, 35),
'which judges most rarely mention, and always with an apology,
are the secret root from which the law draws all the juices of
life.' " 21
Common-law principles can be changed or created at will by
the highest court, especially in a State without a long judicial
history of its own, in so far as the constitutions do not limit them.
Nor is such court usurping power in so doing. The common law
is the result of centuries of such judicial action, as we all very
well know. That is the common-law system of making law at
the same time it is applied to a specific case, just as it was the
civil-law system. That it is the wise system, no instructed person
doubts. When our constitutions and our people adopted the com-
,non law, they adopted that system of making law, and the judges
are no usurpers. And so when the Florida court holds a water
company liable to a citizen for negligent failure to supply suf-
ficient water to put out a fire, and decides that such a company is
under a public duty the breach of which is a tort, it is not usurp-
ing authority. The correctness of its decision is to be tested by
principles of justice, expediency, and public policy.29  It is not
the "whim" of the judge, though all losing clients and their at-
torneys say the judge's whim defeated them. Nor is it meas-
uring by the "chancellor's foot," unless reason, justice, public
policy, experience, and training of mind are as uncertain and
arlitrary as are the sizes of shoes. It is true they are uncertain,
but they are the best We have. In fact, they are all we have; and
that judge, who while deciding a case denies their authority, is
himself following their light to the best of his unwitting ability.
With the question of the expediency and justice and policy
of the Florida rule, this article cannot undertake to deal ex-
haustively; but it is believed that the rule is consistent with them
all and that the contrary rule is not. Here, too, the numerical
28john W. Salmond, 16 Law Quar. Rev., 389.
20 The correctness of this reasoning is fully admitted in Hone v.
Presque Isle W. Co., io4 Me. 217, but the court believed policy and
expediency are against holding the water company. Had it believed with
the Florida court on that matter, it would have held the same way with-
out thinking itself guilty of usurpation.
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weight of authority is against it. Of the cases cited heretofore,
the liability in tort was either not discussed or not decided in the
following: Alabama, Iowa, Kansas, 113 Louisiana, Missouri,
Nebraska, Nevada, Pennsylvania and Tennessee. The cases hold-
ing that there is no liability in tort, usually content themselves
with saying that there is no duty, either contractual or legal.
80
Such cases are those cited from Connecticut, Georgia, Indiana,
Mississippi, New York, and Texas. On this point, also, the Con-
necticut case turned largely on the defects in the pleading. The
United States Supreme Court has shown that it is willing to fol-
low the North Carolina court in holding that the failure of the
water company to supply water may be a tort.
"It may also be true that no citizen is a party to such a con-
tract, and has no contractual or other right to recover for the
failure of the company to act, but if the company proceeds under
its contract, constructs and operates its plant, it enters upon a
public calling. It occupies the streets of the city, acquires rights
and privileges peculiar to itself. It invites the citizens, and if
they avail themselves of its conveniences and omit making other
or personal arrangements for a supply of water, then the com-
pany owes a duty, to them in the discharge of its public calling,
and a neglect by it in the discharge of the obligations imposed
by its charter, or by contract with the city, may be regarded as
a breach of absolute duty, and recovery may be had for such
neglect. The action, however, is not one for breach of contract.
but for negligence in the discharge of such duty to the public,
and is an action for tort."
31
The analogies of the law really support, rather than weaken,
the Florida decision. That water companies are public service
corporations is beyond question. They have a necessary monop-
oly, are given valuable privileges, and must be subject to public
control through both the legislatures and the courts. In the past
the courts have imposed certain special duties upon persons en-
gaged in the public service, as, for example, common carriers and
innkeepers. We may be certain that in the future new public
services will be undertaken by individuals and corporations. The
courts will have the same power to impose duties on them, in
accordance with the character of the service undertaken, that the
30 The case in 3O4 Me. 217 discusses the matter at much greater length,
and with force.
31 Guardian Trust Co. v. Fisher, 200 U. S. 57, by Brewer, J.
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public calling. It occupies the streets f the city, acquires rights
and privileges peculiar to itself. It i ites the iti ens, d if
they avail the selves of its c nveniences it ing t er
or personal arrange ents for a s ly t r, then -
pany owes a duty. to the in t i arge f its li i ,
and a neglect by it in the ischarge f t e li ations sed
by its charter, or by contract ith t t , arded s
a breach of absolute duty, and rec ery
neglect. The. action, ho ever, is t t,
but for negligence in the discharge f
and is an ti rt."31
The analogies of the la really s rt.
the Florida decision. hat ater i
corporations is beyond question.
oly, are given valuable privileges,
control through both the legislatures. t t
the courts have i posed certain i l
gaged in the public service; as, f r l ,
innkeepers. e ay be certain t t f
se.rvices will be undertaken by i i i als a r
courts will have the sa e po er t i ti , i
accordance with the character f t r i t t
30 The case in 10 . 217 disc s t att r at uc r t r lengt ,
and with force.
31 lIardian Trust Co. v. isher, 20 U. . 57, b Bre er, J.
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courts have had in the past. A passenger or shipper has definite
rights against a common carrier, and these rights are not limited
by his contract. In some respects the courts will not permit them
to be abridged by contract. It is true the carrier is liable to no
one with whom it has not had some personal relation. But the
citizen who relies upon a water company for service and protec-
tion, and who pays taxes for such service and protection, is in
such a personal relation. The company's mains and pipes run
through his property, or near enough to serve him. The carrier
owes a duty alike to all who are upon its trains, even though there
may not be an individual contract, or even in spite of an indi-
vidual contract. The water company owes a duty to all the in-
habitants from whom its privileges and compensation are derived,
who rely upon it for public service, as it perfectly well knows,
and whom it has undertaken to serve. 31a The common law is quite
capable of imposing duties and enforcing them in damage sviis
and otherwise, in favor of injured individuals.
Of course, if such public regulation should seem too heavy for
a self-willed public servant to bear, he has the option of retiring
from the public service. But there has been as yet no public out-
cry that water companies are fleeing from Florida, Kentucky or
North Carolina, or that they have been meeting overwhelming
disaster and litigation in those States. Perhaps instead they have.
been supplying the agreed amount of water. The rule adopted
will merely have the effect of compelling a water company to
perform its contracts with diligence. In the absence of such a
rule, it can break its contract with impunity, and can fail to render
its public service without liability.
It is said in the Kentucky case, "The water company did not
covenant to prevent the occurrence of fires, nor that the quantity
of water agreed to be furnished would be a certain and effectual
protection against every fire, and consequently does not in any
sense occupy the attitude of an insurer; but it did undertake to
perform the plain and simple duty of keeping water up to a
designated height in the standpipe." 32
The Florida rule is said to be'new and startling. But the reply
of Barrister Henderson to Lord Coleridge33 fits this case to a T,
though said in a case of a different sort: Lord Coleridge, "It is
3,a See Guardian Trust Co. v. Fisher, 200 U. S., 57, 67.
32 Paducah Lumber Co. v. Paducah W. Sup. Co., 89 Ky. 34o.
33 Henderson v. Folkestone W. Co., i Law Tines Rep., 329.
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surely a startling result." Henderson, "It may be startling to
water companies, but to the plaintiff and their other customers it
may not seem so."
Now that there are more than fifty jurisdictions independently
determining rules supposed to be part of the common law, turn-
ing out thousands of decisions every year, many of which are in
direct conflict, it can certainly no longer be said that a court is
bound by precedents in other jurisdictions. If it is bound author-
itatively by these precedents, by which one, pray? In fact, the
highest court of a State is bound by no precedent, except so far
as the doctrine of stare decisis is applied to its own former de-
cisions. Even this doctrine will in time be honored as much in the
breach as in the observance, for a court's own decisions are be-
coming as babes lost in the pulpy woods of a thousand mighty
tomes and gently but everlastingly -concealed among a million
leaves.
Herein lies the salvation of the common law as a system. Our
multitudes of jurisdictions and our myriads of decisions are bound
to weaken the authority of precedent. The common law can still
grow. Courts will be bound to find the reason underneath the
rule; for there is no rule, there are fifty rules. With a hundred
thousand minds at work, it will go hard if the reason be not
found. The term "Common Law" was once no misnomer, for
it was applied to the king's law, as laid down by his one court,
the Curia Regis, in one country, one jurisdiction. There is not
for us to-day, and there cannot. be, a common law. If in early
times courts could create new writs and new remedies, thus
actually creating new substantive legal rights, but later believed
themselves tied down by precedent to certain common forms, they
are once more set free by the statutory abolition of forms and
the substitution of the civil action. Mr. Maitland has said that
though we have buried the common-law forms of action, they still
rule us from their graves. A wider and deeper outlook historical-
ly, giving us a true understanding of what common law was, and
what it is and is not to-day, and what is the character of its
growth, will now free us from the rule of the dead hand.
Arthur L. Corbin.
Yale University Law School.
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